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Comment
Stephen Senn
I have always felt very guilty about Harold Jeffreys’s
Theory of Probability (referred to as ToP, hereafter). I
take seriously George Barnard’s injunction (Barnard,
1996) to have some familiarity with the four great sys-
tems of inference. I also consider it a duty and gen-
erally find it a pleasure to read the classics, but I find
Jeffreys much harder going than Fisher, Neyman and
Pearson fils or De Finetti. So I was intrigued to learn
that Christian Robert and colleagues had produced an
extensive chapter by chapter commentary on Jeffreys,
honored to be invited to comment but apprehensive at
the task.
Reading Robert et al.’s insightful commentary has
sent me back to Jeffreys. Like them, what I am famil-
iar with is the third edition (as corrected in 1966) and
I have a rather battered copy with pages heavily anno-
tated in pencil. My habit is to put a marginal vertical
line against important passages that merit attention and
a question mark where I don’t understand. There are
lots of both in my copy of Jeffreys.
The commentary by Roberts et al. is a tour de
force. Only statisticians with complete familiarity with
Bayesian methods and a deep understanding of its
many forms could have produced it. It in no way de-
tracts from my admiration for what the authors have
achieved to have to admit that my opinion of Jeffreys is
unchanged. ToP is full of brilliant insights and I return
from it convinced that the man was a genius. However,
I also think that to any outsider, the theory outlined as
a whole will appear to be a bit of a mess.
As a small example of one of these insights, con-
sider the discussion of “Artificial Randomization” in
Section 4.9, not really covered by Robert et al. Among
many interesting points, Jeffreys notes that if a 5 × 5
Latin Square in agriculture is analyzed using the meth-
ods proposed by Fisher, then the row and column totals
have eight degrees of freedom assigned to them and
hence that the polynomial equivalent is a quartic in the
row and the column positions but with no cross-product
terms, which would be a very strange function.
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However, perhaps the most important insight in ToP
concerns the necessity for a prejudice in favour of sim-
pler theories if one wishes to try and rescue the Lapla-
cian proposal of insufficient reason. I was once told by
Peter Freeman that when he and Dennis Lindley inter-
viewed Harold Jeffreys and asked him what he con-
sidered his greatest scientific achievement, they were
stunned when he replied that it was the invention of the
significance test. Thus Chapter V of ToP (reviewed by
Roberts et al. in Section 6) is the one he regarded as
being the most important.
There is a very interesting passage in a letter
of Jeffreys to Fisher of 1 March 1934. [This
correspondence forms pages 149–161 of Henry
Bennett’s edited correspondence of Fisher (Bennett,
1990) but is also available on the web in facsimile
at the very useful site maintained by the University of
Adelaide at http://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/coll/
special//fisher/.] The letter is part of a series initiated
by the fact that papers of theirs that were due to ap-
pear in the Proceedings of the Royal Society. (Later in
this correspondence, on 10 April, Jeffreys raises New-
man’s tramcar problem to which Robert et al. refer in
Section 5.3.) John Aldrich (Aldrich, 2005), in an article
I strongly recommend to any interested in Harold Jef-
freys, has identified this period as being crucial to the
statistical education of Jeffreys who was, it seems, long
unaware that the biologists had something to teach the
physicists.
Fisher and Jeffreys had been invited to take account
of each other’s submissions and were discussing what
modification each should make (if any) to accommo-
date the other’s position. The exchange is interesting
because Jeffreys proves himself to be a fair match for
Fisher and it is a tribute to the respect that Fisher
clearly had for him that despite the fact that Jeffreys is
occasionally rather cheeky to Fisher (suggesting, e.g.,
that if Fisher had chosen to justify likelihood in terms
of work by Jeffreys and Dorothy Wrinch he would have
been on strong ground), Fisher, who was sometimes
irascible in correspondence, never loses his temper and
even later proposes to moderate in the published com-
mentary the terms in which he describes Jeffreys’s the-
ory.
The passage on page 3 of the letter of 1 March reads:
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I got as far as I could with the principle
of non-sufficient reason, but it turns out in
some cases to give answers quite contrary
to general belief. E.G. as Broad pointed out,
it will never give a reasonable probability
to a general law of the form ‘all crows are
black.’
The reference is to the Cambridge philosopher, C. D.
Broad (1887–1971) and to the fact that he had noted
(Broad, 1918) in Mind that if Laplace’s Law of Suc-
cession (discussed by Robert et al. in Section 4.2) ap-
plies and if m counters are drawn at random from a
bag known to contain n counters and all drawn are ob-
served to be white, then the probability that all n are
white is (m+ 1)/(n+ 1) and hence that even if several
logical difficulties in applying the “law” are ignored,
it will never provide a means of proving the probable
truth of any scientific law, for which n must be effec-
tively infinite. [See Aldrich, 2005 for a discussion, and
also Chapter 4 of Dicing with Death (Senn, 2003) for a
heuristic explanation.]
Subsequently, on page 4 of the original letter, Jef-
freys writes:
The principle of non-sufficient reason is in-
tended simply to serve as an expression of
lack of prejudice. . . . But in these cases of
general laws there seems to be prejudice;
I cannot help it, but there is a general belief
in the possibility of establishing quantitative
laws by experience, and I am not prepared
to say that the general belief is wrong.
An interesting feature of this is that Jeffreys effec-
tively admits that the necessity of being able to assert
the conclusion is the justification of the premise. The
solution that he found, as Robert et al. discuss, is to
give a lump of probability to the precise form of the
law. I think that this was a touch of genius, necessary to
rescue the Laplacian formulation. Paradoxically, I sus-
pect, however, that this particular aspect of Jeffreys’s
program is much less used than the other main fea-
ture, namely the use of improper prior distributions,
and it is odd that he did not draw the conclusion that
the principle of non-sufficient reason is generally un-
usable. It seems to me that whatever philosophical dif-
ficulties Jeffreys may have had in accepting Fisher’s
frequency limit view of probability ought to apply in
spades to such improper “probabilities.”
I have two very minor criticisms of Robert et al. The
first is that one should be careful when talking about
Bernoulli. I have a personal probability close to 1 that
the Bernoulli of Section 2.3 is Daniel (1700–1782) and
a similar probability that the Bernoulli of Section 3 is
the same as that in the footnote to Section 9 and hence
is his uncle James (1654–1705). It would have been
helpful to the reader to have them distinguished. The
second is that if one refers to Lindley’s paradox (Lind-
ley, 1957), one should also refer to Bartlett’s correction
(Bartlett, 1957), not least because when the correction
is applied the paradox is seen to be not quite so auto-
matic: two Bayesians could strongly disagree with each
other. Thus, to adapt the rhetoric of Jeffreys’s criticism
of significance tests on page 385 of ToP, if one takes
the paradox as being a reason for rejection Fisherian
significance tests:
it would require that a procedure is dis-
missed because, when combined with infor-
mation which it doesn’t require and which
may not exist, it disagrees with a procedure
that disagrees with itself (Senn, 2001).
Finally, let me say that although there are some as-
pects of ToP which do not enthuse me, it is nonethe-
less full of startling and brilliant insights and all the
more welcome because at the time it appeared it pro-
vided a fresh and distinct alternative to a developing
orthodoxy. Statisticians like me have every reason to
be grateful to Robert et al. for helping us to obey
Barnard’s injunction.
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